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THE EFFECTS OF MALPRACTICE TORT REFORM OF DEFEN IVE MEDICINE 
Heather M. O 'Neill 
Katherine Hennesy 
Department of Bu iness and COn01l11CS 
Ursinus Co llege 
INTRODUCTION 
Medical malpractice crises occur across states to differing degrees, thus the proposed 
changes in tate tort reforms differ according ly. The primary overt goals of tort reform aim to 
address : rising medical malpractice insurance rates , increased frequency and severity of awards, 
and the increased incidence of doctors shuttering offices or fleeing states due to untoward 
malpractice environments . A secondary goa l of tort reform is to reduce health care costs attributed 
to malpractice costs . Clearly, as malpractice tort reforms are debated in state capito ls and reforms 
take place, the effects of the reforms on the goals above can be examined. However, there is an 
often ignored implication of reform requiring attention. How do reforms affect doctors' decision 
and behaviors in treating patients? Specifically, do doctors change their behavior as the 
malpractice environment changes, and if so, do these changes affect health care costs? Given the 
variety of state tort reforms occurring over the last severa l years, we can examine how each one 
affects hea lth care cost attributed to changes in physician behavior. 
Since the early 1970's econom ists, lawyers, and many within the medical community 
have debated the existence of defensive medicine. Using the Office of Technology Assessment 
the definitions (OTA, 1994), positive defensive medicine occurs when physicians order additiona l 
tests or procedures primarily to avoid malpractice li abi lity. Negative defensive medicine occurs 
when doctors avoid certain patients or treatments chiefly out of concern for malpractice liability. 
The thrust of this paper deals with positive defensive medicine. Given different malpractice 
environment across states, we witness variation in positive defensive medicine practices leading 
to differences in health care expenditures. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we note the existence of defensive medicine . 
Next, we discuss malpractice tort reform across states. Lastly, we show which reforms have 
demonstrable impacts on defensive medicine and therefore on health care expenditures. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE 
There are three methods to assess the existence of defensive medicine, and a ll three 
have demonstrated its prevalence. In the first method, physicians are asked to estimate how 
often they order additional tests and procedures or avoid certain patients. Hickson et a l 
(1998) found 80% of pediatricians surveyed practiced positive defensive medicine. OTA 
(1994) summarized finding of sixteen surveys and revea led anywhere from 21 to 8 1 percent 
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of physicians contended they ordered additional tests out of fea r of litigation. Most recently, 
the Philadelphia Inquirer (2005) reported the Pew Charitab le Trust, working on the Project on 
Medical Liability in Pennsylvania , found 93 % of 824 physician respondents in s ix high risk 
specialties indicated they practiced positi ve defensive medicine. 
The second method uses physician surveys to assess physician actions g iven specific 
hypothetical clinical s ituations, thus enabling focu s on physician specia lties and clinical 
scenarios in which defensive medicine i a concem. In 1993 , the OTA conducted clinical 
surveys of obstetricians, gyneco logists and surgeons and revealed the percentage of 
respondents who chose " malpractice concerns" as the primary reason for administering a 
clinical action ranged from 4.9% for back pain scenario to 29% for head trauma, with an 
average of 8% across the study (OTA, 1994). The estimated aggregate cost of defensive 
Cesarean deliveries was $8.7 million in 1991 , compared to the aggregate cost of defensive 
diagnostic radiology of the head for American ages 5 to 24 to be $45 million (OTA, 1994). 
The third method, health care utilization studies, mitigates the biases associated with 
the hypotheti ca l nature of the above phys ician surveys. Patient hospital records are linked to 
patient hea lth status, hospital demographics and geographic considerations to assess the 
utilization and cost of defensi ve tests . Here, the data are real, not hypothetical, thus avoiding 
possible bias in the physician responses. Additionally, since information is kept on each 
patient, the sample size can be extensive and robust. Localio et al (1993) found in the case of 
Cesarean deli veries, patients in a hospital with high frequency obstetric malpractice claims 
were 32% more likely to undergo a Cesarean delivery than patients in a hospital with low 
claim frequency. Kington (1994) and Baldwin et al (1995) also witnessed defensive medicine 
in obstetrics practices. 
LEGISLATURES ENACT TORT REFORM IN RESPONSE TO MALPRACT[CE CRISES 
Literature on malpractice has identified two periods prior to today in which the 
malpractice system was in crisis: one in the mid-1970 's and one in the 1980 's. Both led to 
s ignificant increases in malpractice premiums and heightened concerns of doctors and hospitals . 
In response to the crises, some states enacted tort reforms . The goal of reform following the 
1970's crisis was threefold. Legislators wanted: to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring 
non-negligent suits to trial; to define standards of care and consent; and, to limit the total costs 
associated with plaintiff awards for successful suits (Barker, 1992). 
Several indirect reforms , those indirectly affecting monetary awards, were enacted. Prior 
to 1970, most states had statute of limitations with discovery rules , indicating statutes did not 
begin until after the injury was discovered . By allowing claims to be filed several years after the 
date of injury, it contributed great uncertainty to malpractice insurance pricing. To reduce 
uncertainty, 34 states shortened their statute of limitations. Most statute reforms reduced the total 
limitations pe riod to 2-3 years and decreased the length of time permitted for injury discovery 
(Barker, 1992.) 
Anothe~ i~1direct reform concerned the doctrine known as res ispa loquitur, "the thing 
speaks for itse lf." This doctrine originally permitted juries to infer negligence based on the 
premise the defendant has exclusive control over the instrument causing injury, and that the 
instrument does not injure when used in a non-negligent manner. Reforms of this doctrine defined 
circumstances under which the doctrine applied . Similarly, many states defined the standard of 
care physicians were expected to provide. By defining acceptable standards of care, legislators 
essentially codified professional tandards into a legally binding form rather than an honor code. 
There were also several reforms enacted to limit malpractice awards directly . After 1975, 
nine states enacted reforms capping malpractice awards values; seven of the states capped total 
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da mage award while two slates capped on ly non-economic damage of pain and suffering 
(Barker, (992). everal s tates created Patient ompen ation Fund (P F) . Phy ician in the e 
tates were responsible fo r awards up to a certa in dol lar amount, after which the PCF paid the 
remainder. Mod ification of the co llatera l source ru le was another direct reform enacted. 
Orig ina lly, thi s rule prohi bited ev idence of co llatera l award ource to be intr duced to the jury. 
Refo rm a ll owed j uri es to co nsider, and ometimes mandated, juries to lower awards when 
pla intiffs had co ll atera l awa rd sources . T hese co llateral so urces cou ld include other physicians, 
hospi ta l or insurance compa ni es. By enacting such reforms, plai ntiff: cou ld no longer receive 
dupli ca te malpractice awards from mul tiple so urces. 
To reduce costs as ociated with litiga ti on, th ree major reforms were enacted . F irst, some 
tates mandated pretri a l screening requiring potentia l cases screened by a pane l before proceed ing 
to tri al. Cases deemed un wo rthy did not reach tria l, thus e liminating unnecessary tria l expen es . 
Thirteen s tates created prov i ions fo r arbitra ti on, e ither vo lun ta ry or mandatory, between pretria l 
di scovery and trial to e liminate expense associated w ith tr ia l (Ba rker, 1992). Under mandatory 
arbitrati on, third party decis ions were binding and could not be appea led . A third reform capped 
contingency fees fo r atto rney representation, limiting the percentage of the award co llected by 
lawyers foll owing successfu l tri a ls. 
An a lternati ve way of class ify ing reforms is by the impact they have on phys ic ian 
behav ior, e ither directly and immedi ate ly or indirectly over time. The li ke lihood of a phys ic ian 
making a payment in a case of presumed negli gence is the probab ili ty of be ing sued times the 
magnitude of the award . We categori ze refo rms reducing the li ke lihood of being sued, thu the 
frequency of being sued, as direct impacts s ince they w ill immedia te ly a lter phys ician behavior. 
There are four primary to rt re forms that can directl y impact behavior: use of arbi tration boards, 
introdu cti on o f pre- tri a l screening, res tri cted contingency fees and statute of limi tations reductions. 
If phys ic ians beli eve the ir action w ill be rev iewed by objecti ve experts to determine if negligence 
occurred , they will be less inclined to practice defens ive medicine, regardless of the s ize of the 
awa rd . Restri cting contingency fees w ill reduce the li ke lihood of being sued because attorneys 
w ill more care full y scrutinize which ca es to contes t. Reducing the statute of limitati ons reduces 
the probability of being sued by limiting cases to timely observable injuries or dea ths. 
Other re forms reduce the expected awa rds to c la imants or severity of the claim, thu the 
ex pected payout by the physicians, and we categorize the e as indirect impacts. Since doctors 
have malpracti ce insurance, the payout i generally paid by the insurance company leav ing small , 
if any, out-o f-p ocket expenses by the phys icians. This sugges ts less immedi ate changes in 
behav ior by doctors due to the third party payment. Though large insurance payouts lead to hi gher 
future malpracti ce premiums for doctor , thi s out-of-pocket ex pen e is incurr d over time and 
leads to changes in behav ior over a longer time peri od, such as doctors leav ing practices or s tates. 
Capping damages, ins tituting co llatera l source rules, c reating PCF's, allowing for peri odi c, not 
lump sum, payments and haring blame through j o int and several liability c lauses will reduce the 
severity of the c laim 's award and alter phys ic ian behav ior indirectly. 
LINKfNG DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND TORT REFORM 
Kess ler and Mc le i Ian 's ( 1996) study exa mined how tort re form and malpracti ce 
environments impact de fens ive medi c ine. The authors used longitudina l da ta on Medi care 
pati ents from 1984 , 1987, and 1990 who were trea ted fo r acute myocardi a l infarcti on (A MI) 
and new ischemic hea rt di sease (fHD). They compared hospita l expenditures, holding health 
outcomes constant, across states with tort reform to those without re form. Hospita l 
expenditure growth was 2-6% lower in re form states for A MI with li ghtly g rea ter differences 
for fHD . Expenditures in sta tes adopting direct re forms, those des igned to reduce awards, 
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declined 5.3% relative to non-reforming states and expenditures in states with indirect reforms 
increased 1.8% relative to non-reforming states. Overall , the ir results show direct reforms 
reduce expenditure growth without increasing mortality whil e indirect reforms have no 
ub tantial effects on expenditure or mortality. 
METHOD 
We develop a healthcare utilization multiple regression model to discover how state 
malpractice environments influence the 'Practice of positive defensive medicine. The scope of the 
study is limited to patients aged 18-65 with skull fractures, since skull fractures are associated 
with a high leve l of risk and uncertainty, making it like ly defensive medicine occurs. We contend 
reductions in state malpractice pressures will diminish the level of defensive medicine associated 
w ith these patients and result in substantial cost savings. Unlike Kessler and McClellan 's (1996) 
use of direct or indirect reforms , we study the individual impacts of twelve reforms . We examine 
how much of an impact the reforms have on defensive medicine according to our taxonomy of 
direct versus indirect impact on physician behavior. 
An interview with surgeon Dr. Stanton Miller (2003) highlights how defensive medicine 
occurs with head trauma patients. He contends generally the only tests needed to evaluate a 
patient admitted with a head injury are a comprehensive neurological exam along with a 
comprehensive examination of the rest of the body. However, due to fear of liability, physicians 
frequently order additional tests such as Computerized Tomography tests (CT scans) or Magnetic 
Resonance Imagery (MRl) tests. These tests have an approximate cost of $400 and $1,000 to 
$ 1,500, respectively. Physicians may also call neurolog ists in for consultations, tacking on 
another $250 to the bill. Finally, if a physician suspects that a patient has a traumatic head injury, 
he or she will probably put the patient in the [ntensive Care Unit overnight ($2,000+) so that the 
patient's neurological conditions can be monitored for internal bleeding and other injuries 
(Miller). Thus, a patient treated for a head injury may have over $3,500 in additional charges due 
to defensive medical practices. 
The dependent variable, total patient expenditures, is used as a means of assessing the 
level of defensive medicine practiced in each state. To distinguish the effect of state malpractice 
environmental factor from other factors contributing to variations in patients' total expenditures, 
independent variable vectors accounting for patient and hospital demographics have been 
included. Dummy variables for various tort reform serve as identifiable measures of differences 
in state malpractice environments. 
Variables within the patient and hospital demographic vectors can account for differences 
in patients ' hospital expenditures. Though each variable will have its own individual impact on 
charges, each can be held constant to examine the individual role of tort reform on total charges. 
For example, patient's length of stay, number of diagnoses , and number of medical procedures 
positively impact charges, but these can be held constant serv ing as control variables to assess the 
tort reform impacts . The other general patient demographics are age, gender, patient income and 
payment source. The hospital demographic vector includes variables describing hospital control, 
size, location, and teaching status. 
Twelve dummy variables for various tort reforms are used in the model , as shown in 
Tables I and [1. We hypothesize physicians working in states with tort reform that directly or 
indirectly impacts physician behavior will practice less defensive medicine than their counterparts 
in non-reform states, leading to less total patient expenditure. Thus, the tort dummy variables are 
expected to have negative regression coefficients. 
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DATA 
The data come from two sources. Information on tota l pati ent expenditures patient 
demographi cs, and hosp ita l demographics, for patients who had primary, secondary, or tertiary 
di agnoses of skull fractures are de ri ved fro m the 2000 Nationw ide Inpatient ample, part of the 
Healthcare Cost and Util ization Project sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Re earch and 
Quali ty.1 T his data set contains 7,450,992 in patient hospital stays from 994 hospitals in 28 states. 
To make patients as similar as poss ible, severa l re trictions are p laced on the patients considered 
in thi s study. Age is res tri cted to patients 18 to 65 old for two reasons. F irst, minors are 
e liminated because they are ubj ect to di fferent malpractice statutes of lim itations in many states. 
econd, the e lderly are eliminated because literatu re on malpractice suits has shown that 
successful e lderly c laimants are awa rded low do llar amoun ts due to the ir lesser li fe expectancies. 
We e liminated outliers fo r length of stay and number of diagnoses ; we on ly chose patients with 
fewer than e leven days in the hosp ital and fewer than eleven d iagnoses with their hospita l 
encounter. The total charges obtained from the NIS were defl ated by regional or state CPIs to 
account for vari ations in the price of medi cal care serv ices .2 Due to restrictions and missing data, 
our sample s ize is limited to 23 states and approx imate ly 3492 pati ents. 
The second source of data used for state to rt laws come from the American Medica l 
Association Advocacy Resource Center' s state law charts on li ability reform . Dummy var iab les 
fo r the malpract ice tort laws listed in Table I are crea ted for each state and are presen ted in Tab le 
II. The statute of limitati ons va ri ab le is the max imum number of yea rs during which a cla imant 
can commence a medica l li abili ty acti on. Due to lagging time effects between when reforms are 
enacted and when phys ic ians behaviora ll y respond to these reforms, a two-year window of time is 
permitted fo r each reform. Hence, reforms enacted after 1997 are not considered in th is analysis of 
2000 patient data. 
I The di agnoses codes for skull fractures are based on the ICD-9CM codes valid fo r the 
patient 's di scharge date and inc lude: 800.00-800.99 (Fracture of skull vault), 80 1.00-80 1.99 
(Fracture of skull base), and 803 .00-803.99 (Other and unqualifi ed skull fractures) . Information 
on ICO-9-CM codes was obta ined from a topsSearch ICO-9 Tria l on e-mds.com and UMEA 
Uni versity's online directory oflCD-9-CM Internati onal Coding Standard . 
2 Kansas was selected as the base state in thi s analys is because of its base line number of 
malpracti ce tort re forms. cpr data for the year 2000 w~re. obta ined from the Urban Consumer 
Series "All Hems" cpr index ava ilable on Bureau of Labor Stati sti cs' website. If data for a 
metropoli tan area within a given state were available or the state was c ited as hav ing a cpr value 
corresponding to a metropolitan area in a nea rby state, this cpr va lue was used. If data fo r severa l 
metropolitan areas within a state or corresponding to a state were ava ilable, the average of these 
va lues were used. For states in whi ch there were no corresponding metropoli tan areas associated , 
the regional (N ortheast, Mid west, South , or West) "All Items" Urban CPI va lue was used. This 
method of cpr base lining is the best approx imation that can be made, g iven th e limi ted amount of 
CPI informati on ava il able fo r loca ti ons around the nation. 
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Tab le [: Malpractice Tort Laws Used in Analysis 
Reform Description of reform 
Arbitration (Permitted) Arb itration is permitted, but not mandated. 
Arbi tration (Mandatory) Arbitration is mandated . 
Pre-judgment Claimants need to obtain a certifi cate of affidav it of merit wi thin a 
certa in amount of time in order to pursue medical li ab ility action. 
Contingency Fee Cap The proportion of an award that an attorney can contractua lly charge 
is statutorily capped at a specific level. 
Statute of Limitations The max Imum number of years (from incident occurrence, 
discovery, or the max imum time limit) during which a claimant can 
commence an action for med ical liability 
Co llateral Source Rule Damages payab le in a malpractice suit are statutoril y reduced by all 
Reform or part of the dollar value of co llateral-source payments to the 
plaintiff. 
Damage Caps Either noneconomic, total damages , or both types of damages are 
(noneconomic or tota l capped at a statutorily established dollar amount. 
damaKes) 
Damage Caps (puniti ve Puniti ve damages are capped at a statutorily estab li shed dollar 
damages) amount. 
Joi nt and Several The Joint and Several Liab ili ty rule IS abolished either for 
Liab ili ty Rule Reform noneconomic or tota l damages in all claims, such that damages 
payable in a malpractice suit are sta tutorily allocated in proportion to 
the tortfeasors' degree of fau lt. 
Periodic Payment of Part or all of the damages are permitted to be disbursed in the form 
Awards (Permi tted) of an annui ty that pays out over time. 
Periodic Payment of Part or all of the damages must to be di sbursed in the form of an 
Awards (Mandatory) annuity that pays out over time. 
Physician A state-administered excess malpracti ce liability insurance program 
Compensation Fund ex ists for phys icians. 
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Tab le II : State Tort Coding Matrix as of 2000 
State Arbit Prejudge ContFeeCap S ta tLim Co lISoRef DamCap JntSevL PeriodPay P CF 
AZ 0 0 0 2 \ 0 I 0 0 
CA 1 0 \ 3 1 \ 0 1 0 
CO \ 1 0 3 1 \ 1 2 0 
CT 1 0 \ 3 1 0 \ \ 0 
FL \ 1 0 4 0 0 1 \ 1 
IL 0 1 \ 4 1 0 0 \ 0 
KS 1 \ 0 4 0 1 1 1 0 
KY 0 0 0 \ 0 0 1 1 0 
MA 0 0 \ 7 I \ 0 0 0 
MD 2 1 0 5 0 1 0 I 0 
MO 0 \ 0 10 0 I 0 1 0 
NC 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
NJ 0 \ \ 2 1 2 1 0 0 
NY \ \ \ 2. 5 I 0 1 2 0 
OR 0 0 I 5 0 0 0 0 0 
PA \ 0 0 7 0 2 0 1 1 
SC 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 1 
TN \ 0 0 3 J 0 1 0 0 
TX \ 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 
VA 2 0 0 2 0 \ 0 \ 0 
WA 2 0 0 8 I 0 0 \ 0 
WI 1 0 1 5 \ 1 1 \ I 
GA \ \ 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 
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STATE TORT CODING KEY * 
* Al l reforms took effect in prior to 1998 in order to allow for lag time between tort reform 
enactment and physician behavior change. 
Arbitration: 
Arbit= 0 if there are no provi s ions for arbitration. 
Arb it= 1 if there arb itration is permitted (vo luntary) . 
(In regre sion ana lysis transformed to : ArbitVol= 1.) 
Arbit= 2 if their arbitration is mandatory . 
(In regression ana lys is transformed to : ArbitMand= 1.) 
Pre-judgment measures: 
PreJudge= 0 if c laimants do not need to obtain a certificate/affidavit of merit within a 
certa in amount of time in order to pursue a medica l li ability action . 
PreJudge= L if claimants must (mandated) fil e a certifi cate/affidav it of merit within a 
certain amount of time in order to pursue a medical li ability action . 
Contingency Fee Caps: 
ContFeeCap= 0 if contingency fees are not capped (This includes HI, lA, and W A where 
courts must approve/determine reasonable contingency fees.) 
ContFeeCap= 1 if contingency fees are capped. 
Statute o[Limitations: 
StatLim= #. This number is the max imum number of years (from incident occurrence 
or discovery) during which a claimant can commence an action for medica l 
liab ility. In cases where there were different time limits for occurrence, 
discovery, or a maxi mum statute of limitations I have used the maximum time 
limit. 
Collateral Source Rule: 
Co lISoRef= 0 if the co ll atera l source rule is in effect Uuries cannot consider cla imants' 
externa l compensation sources). 
ColiSoRef= 1 if the co llateral source rule has been reformed such that juries are permitted 
to consider c laimants' external compensa tion sources. 
Damage Caps: 
DamCap= 0 if there are no caps on any type of damage award. 
DamCap= I if there are caps on noneconomic/total damages . (In regression analysis 
transformed to : DamCapNT= I.) 
DamCap= 2 if there are caps on punitive damages only (In regress ion analysis 
transformed to : DamCapPun= 1.) 
Joint and Several Liabilitv Rule: 
JntSevL= 0 if joint and several liability is in effect Uoint tortfeasors are each responsible 
for the entire judgment) 
JntSevL= 1 if joint and several liability has been reformed such that damages are 
allocated in proportion to tortfeasors ' degree of fault) 
Periodic Payment o[damages: 
PeriodPay= 0 if there are no provisions for periodic payments of damages 
PeriodPay= L if periodic payment of damages is permitted, but mandated (In regression 
analysis transformed to : PerPayPerm = 1.) 
PeriodPay= 2 if periodic payment of damages is mandated (In regression analysis 
transformed to : PerPayMand = I .) 
Ph ysician Compensation Funds: 
PCF= 0 if the state did not have a patient compensation fund in 2000. 
PCF= 1 if the state had a patient compensation fund in 2000. 
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RESULTS 
Ordinary least squares regress ion results correcting for heteroskedasti city us ing White's 
test are repo rted in Tab le Ill. T he mean total charge for pati ents w ith skull fractures was $2 1,127, 
in 2000 dollars , w ith an adj usted R -square of .49 . S ince the purpose of the paper is to eva luate the 
refo rm impacts, di scussions of the nu merous s tatistically s ignifi cant contro l variab les are not 
included? A ll but one tort reform, vo lun ta ry arbitration, have a s ignificant impact on the practice 
of defensive medi cine, though not a ll va ri ables yie ld the expected s igns on their coe ffic ients. 
Three of the fo ur direct impacts indicate s ignificant savings from to rt reform. T he reform 
with the larges t nega ti ve coefficient, indicating the most important reform in terms of savings 
from reduced de fens ive med ic ine, is mandatory arbitration. Hav ing a prov is ion for mandatory 
arb itration reduces to ta l skull fracture charges by $ 12,177, a s igni ficant amount compared to the 
mean of$2 1, 127. T his resul t supports th e theory that physicians fear malpractice sui ts going to 
court and practi ce less defensive medicine w hen suits must first be assessed by an arb itration 
board . Interesting ly, hav ing a vo luntary arbitrati on po li cy has no impact, imp ly ing the po licy 
needs to have teeth to be effective. Similar to mandatory arbitration, pre-j udgment measures 
reduce charges by $5,174.99 , imp lying phys ic ians w ill practice less defensive medicine if states 
screen claims before they can proceed to court. It appears doctors practice s igni fica ntly less 
defens ive medic ine knowing arbitra ti on or screening boards cull through cases fi rst. Las tly, 
enacting contingency fee caps, which presumably reduce the frequency of claims, reduce charges 
by $4,534. 50. 
Three o f the indirect impacts also reduce patient expendi tures . Mandatory periodic 
payments reduce charges by $7,842.9 1 sugges ting phys icians fee l less threatened w hen payments 
are disbursed over time rather than a lump sum. The magnitude of this coefficient indicates it is 
the second most cos t sav ing refo rm. Hav ing phys icians res pons ible fo r the same proportion of 
damages as their actions contribute in a med ica l liability case using j o int and severa l liab ili ty rules 
s ignificantly redu ces charges by $2,474.77 . The ex istence of sta te pe F ' s reduces defensive 
medi ca l ca re by $ 1,856.49. These latter two reforms have less bang-per-buck as the d irect impacts 
above. 
Statute of limi ta tion re forms have a s ignificant, but unexpected, effect on to ta l charges . 
For each additiona l yea r a pati ent is able to take medi ca l li abili ty acti on, there is a $ 1,504.69 
decrease in tota l charges fo r skull fracture patients . Theory predi cts that a llowing pati ents an 
additi onal yea r to take acti on w ill increase the volume of malpractice claims fil ed, thus cause 
phys ic ians to prac ti ce more defensive medicine; if a physician knows that a pa ti ent has more years 
in w hich he or she can fil e a malpractice suit, then perhaps the phys ic ian ord ers more tests to 
p rocect fro m a suit cl a iming the proper standard of care was not met. Thus, although the length of 
time to bring a sui t is s ignifi cant, th e real issue is the phys ic ian 's ri sk of being sued . It is poss ible 
that a risk platea u or peak ex ists for statutes of limitati ons such th at after a certain number of 
yea rs, the probability of a malpractice c laim be ing fil ed e ither plateaus or drops dra ti ca lly. More 
research on the re lati onship between defensive med icine and statute of limitations reducti ons is 
needed before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Four indirect impact re forms show results in contrast w ith expectations. T he co llateral 
source rule, periodi c payments, and damage cap reforms s ignificantly increase tota l charges, 
suggesting more de fensive medi c ine. Having a co ll atera l source reform increases skull fracture 
3 For example, T able III indicates for each additiona l day of hospitalization, tota l charges 
increase $3, 191 .70, ceteris paribus. Similarly, each additional procedure increases tota l charges 
by $3,716.70, whereas an additiona l diagnosis raises patient charges by $ 191.68. 
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Intercept (-0 .06) 
Patient Demographics Malpnctice Tort Law Reforms 
(AGE) : Age 
-$ 130.98 (ARB fTVOL) : Arbitration- $686.8 1 
(-0 .83) Voluntary (0.67) 
(FEMALE): Gender 
-$ 17.34** (ARBfTMAND): Arbitration- -$ 12, 177.00*** 
(-2.7 1) Mandatory (- 10.40) 
(MEDICAID) : Medicaid $3 ,596.63* * 
(PREJUDGE) : Pre-judgment 
-5,174 .99*** 
Insurance (2 .85) (-6 .18) 
(PRIVATE): Pri vate Insurance 
$30.30 (CONTFEECAP): Contingency -4,534.50*** 
(0.06) Fee Cap (-5 .27) 
(TWENTYFJVE): Income -$1 ,535 .95 
(STATLIM): Statute of Limitations 
-1,504.69*** 
$25,000-34 ,999 (-1.54) ( -8.98) 
(THfR TYFI VE) : Income -$1,410.69 (COLLSOREF): Co llatera l Source $3,866.88*** 
$35 ,000-44,999 (- 1.50) Rule (4.73) 
(FORTYFJVE) : Income $ 1,84 1.90 (DAMCAPNT) : Damage Caps- $2,584.30*** 
$45 ,000 + ( 1.90)* N oneconom ic/Total (3 .97) 
Patient Hospital Stay (DA MCAPP UN) : Damage Caps- $2,226.01** 
Demographics Punitive (2.0 1) 
(LOS): Length of Stay 
$3 , 19 1.70*** (JNTSEVL) : Joint and Severa l -$2,474.77** 
(25 .59) Liability ( -2 .69) 
(NDX) : Number of Diagno es 
$19 1.68 (PERPAYPERM) : Periodic $2,775 .17*** 
( 1.59) Payment- Permitted (3.48) 
(NPR): Number of $3,716.70*** (PERPAYMAND) : Peri od ic -7 ,842.91*** 
Procedures ( 15.88) Payment- Mandatory (-5 .32) 
(PCF) : Physician Compensation -$ 1,856.49** 
Hospital Demographics Fund (-2.03) 
(TEACH) : Teaching facility 
$654.39 
(0 .64) 
(URBAN): Urban location 
$7,063.70*** 
(8.29) 
Adju ted R2 = 0.4862 
$3,954 .6 1 *** 
(URBAN): Large size Condition Index = 35.9 1244 
(7 .22) 
$2,686 .13** 
Dependent Mean (tota l charges) = $2 1, 127 
(PUBLIC) : Public facility 
(2.29) 
(VOLUNTA Ry): Non-profit $2,7 14.92** 
facil ity (2.00) 
Notes: 
a t-values were produced using White 's consistent estimators of the variance. 
b All coefficient estimates use 2000 dollars. 
* Significance at the 10% confidence leve l; ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1 % level 
The Effects of Malpractice Tort Reform 011 Def en ive Medicille 85 
patient charges by $3 ,866 .88. Caps on non-economic or total awards increase charges by 
$2,584.30, whi le caps on punitive damages increase charges by 2,226.01 . Permitting periodi c 
payments increase total charges by $2,775 .17. A poss ible explanation for th ese results is they 
re ult from an endogenous relationship between tort reforms and the degree of state malpracti ce 
crises. Tort reforms are often enacted in state in reaction to a malpractice cri s is occurring. These 
crises , often manifested through large annua l physician malpractice premium increases that can 
lead to declines in practicing physicians , lead to reforms concerned with reducing the economi c 
impact on physicians. A ll four indirect impacts noted above attempt to reduce doctor outlays . 
Thus, the signifi cantly positive coefficients on these four variables may reflect this endogenous 
relationship between states in malpractice crises and the reforms they enact, and the fact that it 
takes time for the reforms to become effective. For examp le, as of 2000, Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, Texas and Georgia, for states deemed in crisis by the American Medical Association , 
allowed caps on punitive damages only (American Medical Assoc iation , 2005) . Additionally, 
total charges in these states are hi gher than average. The positive coefficients may reflect 
lingering crises effects that the reforms have not yet fixed . 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is strong ev idence that va ri atio ns in state malpractice environments s ign ificantly 
influence the leve l of defensive medicine practiced by physicians on sku ll fractu re patients . 
Specifically, states enacting reforms directly impacting doctors' behavior witness reductions in 
patient expenditu res on sku ll fractures . States requiring mandatory arb itration reduce charges on 
average by $ 12,177, over half the mean hosp ital charge for skull frac ture patients. Pre-judgment 
measures save $5, 175 on average. We contend these reforms most directly affect doctors' 
behaviors s ince doctors have more confidence in a system that eschews frivolous or unwarranted 
cases. Capping attorney fees save $4,534 per skull fracture patient presumab ly by reducing the 
expected number of suits filed . Additionally, states mandating periodic payment of awards 
witness s ignificantly reduced charges of $7,843 per skull fracture patient, though we posit this 
indirectl y, or less immediately, alters phys ic ian behavior. In contrast, damage caps and co ll atera l-
source rul e reforms, designed to reduce out-of-pocket costs to physicians, do not reduce defensive 
med icine costs. 
The results are consistent with some of Kessler and McClellan 's (1996) findin gs, though 
contrary to others. Both studies find that joint and several li ability rules and mandatory periodic 
payments reduce patient expenditures. Kessler and McCle llan 's ( 1996) results, however, show 
damage caps reduce exp·enditures, contrary to findin gs here. Danzo n ( 1986) finds damage caps 
decrease claims severity, but not their frequency. If this is the case, then phys ic ians do not 
perceive a reduced likelihood of being sued with damage caps in place and thus do not practice 
less defensive medicine, which would contradict Kess ler and McClellan 's findin gs. The pos iti ve 
coefficient on damage caps here is not inconsistent with Danzon, and as mentioned previously, the 
endogeniety between higher medical costs malpractice crises may best explain it. 
Kraus (1996) estimates approximately 2 million head injuries occur each year. If only 
half are skull fractures for people aged 18-65 enacting mandatory arbitration could save over $12 
billion in skull fracture defensive medical practices. Considering this estimate represents savings 
from less than one percent of the total patient population, total defensive medicine costs across 
numerous injuries and illnesses are potentially tremendous . 
Policy makers should seriously consider the impact of state malpractice tort reforms on the 
practice of positive defensive medicine to reduce health care expenditures. Tho e reforms directly 
impacting physician behavior offer enormous savings in skull fracture diagnoses. Given previous 
studies in obstetrics noting the existence of positive defensive medicine, it is likely a study such as 
--- ._------ -------
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ours us ing obstetrics data would al 0 find significant savi ngs. Reforms designed to reduce the 
frequency or like lihood of frivolous law uit offer the greatest savings. Some reforms attempting 
to r duce the everity of awards, such as joint and severa l liability rules, mandated periodic 
payment and PCF' , offer les er sav ing on average. Damage caps and co llatera l source rules do 
not appear to reduce po iti ve defen s ive m dicine, though they may impact physicians moving 
practices or avo iding certa in types of practices. 
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